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STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

LARRY BRUCE DIETZ,
aka THOMAS LEONARD,

:

Case No. 950769-CA

Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Defendant Larry Dietz appeals the trial court's refusal to
reduce his conviction for a second degree felony theft

(R. 16) .

Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-6-405 (1995) and 76-6-412 (Supp. 1995).
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a3(f) (Supp. 1995).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
Did the trial court properly refuse to lower the degree of
defendant's conviction based on his plea to second degree felony
theft where he based his motion on an unestablished fact, and
where the original conviction gave defendant that for which he
bargained?

Because this issue involves the interpretation of

case law, it presents a question of law reviewed for correctness.
State v. Thurman. 846 P.2d 1256, 1271 (Utah 1993).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES. AND RULES

Addendum A contains the text of Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-6-4 05
(1995) (theft statute), 76-6-412 (1995) (old theft
classifications), 76-6-412 (Supp. 1995)(amended theft
classifications), 76-6-501 (1995) (old forgery statute), and 76-6501 (Supp. 1995)(amended forgery statute).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The State charged defendant with three counts of second
degree felony forgery pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501
(1995) (R. 1, 22-23, 30). Defendant agreed to plead guilty to
one count of second degree felony theft by deception in exchange
for the State's dismissal of the three forgery counts and
agreement not to prosecute him for any additional similar 1994
thefts discovered in Box Elder county; defendant pleaded guilty
to second degree felony theft on May 15, 1995 (R. 2-3, 12, 16,
30) .
By order dated May 15, 1995, the trial court sentenced
defendant to the statutory prison term for second degree felony
theft (one-to-fifteen-years), imposed a $2,500.00 fine, and
ordered defendant to pay restitution (R. 17). Defendant later
moved to withdraw his guilty plea (R. 20-23).

At the motion

hearing, defendant withdrew his motion to withdraw his guilty

2

claiming that the facts supported only a class A misdemeanor
theft conviction (R. 61, 80-82, 89-90).

The trial court denied

his motion for reduction on October 31, 1995 (R. 61-65).
Defendant filed his notice of appeal November 13, 1995 (R. 68).a

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant engaged in a scheme where he would purchase money
orders, alter the face amount, use the altered money orders to
purchase inexpensive items, then keep the difference (R. 31, 35).
The three money orders the State recovered had an original face
value of $3-00 that defendant had altered to read $100.00 (R.
31) .
The State charged defendant with three counts of second
degree felony forgery for the three money orders it had recovered
(R. 30). The parties ultimately entered into a plea agreement
with the following terms: 1) defendant would plead guilty to a
single count of second degree felony theft by deception; 2) the

defendant's notice of appeal states he seeks to appeal his
sentencing, but identifies the date the trial court orally ruled
on his motion to reduce his conviction (R. 68). Therefore,
defendant presumably appeals only the denial of his motion to
resentence; any challenge to the original sentencing must fail
because defendant did not timely file his notice of appeal. Utah
R. App. P. 4(a); State v. Montoya. 825 P,2d 676, 678 (Utah App.
1991).
3

State would dismiss the three forgery counts; and 3) the State
would not prosecute defendant for any further money orders passed
in Box Elder County during 1994 (R. 30-31).2
Effective May 1, 1995, the legislature amended both the
forgery statute and the theft classification statutes.
legislature made all forgeries a third degree felony.
Ann. § 76-6-501 (Supp. 1995).

The
Utah Code

The legislature amended the

classifications for theft, requiring proof of property valued at
$5,000.00 or more to support a second degree felony and of
$1,000.00 to $5,000.00 to support a third degree felony.
Defendant entered his plea at the May 15, 1995 arraignment
(R. 16). At that time, the State acknowledged that it knew of
only three money orders (R. 35). The State also stated, however,
that it suspected more and that defendant had privately admitted
to more (id,).3

The State concluded, *[Defendant] was charged

earlier with multiple second degree felonies, but because of

2

Defendant also agreed to pay restitution on all discovered
money orders (R. 30).
defendant stated he had passed six altered money orders in
Tremonton, but did not state the amount to which he altered them
or whether he contended those represented all of the altered
money orders (R. 31). Defendant's counsel later represented that
defendant passed a total of six in Box Elder County (R. 40) ;
however, defendant passed at least one in Brigham City that he
did not acknowledge (R. 5, 77) .
4

recent legislative changes, it is appropriate to lump them all
together and make a single second degree" (id.).

Defendant

agreed that the State accurately represented what had happened

(is2L).
Defendant later moved to withdraw his guilty plea,
contending that his trial counsel did not know about the forgery
reclassification to a third degree felony and therefore did not
properly advise him (R. 22-23) . At the motion hearing, trial
counsel stated that he would not have advised his client to plead
to second degree felony theft rather than to three counts of
third degree felony forgery and the court should vacate the plea
(R. 73-75).

Defendant then contended that the facts introduced

at the plea hearing established, at most, theft of $700.00: only
enough for a class A misdemeanor under the theft
reclassificat ions (R. 80, 82, 84-85, 89-90)•

Based on that

claim, defendant withdrew his motion to withdraw his guilty plea
and asked the trial court to resentence him to a class A
misdemeanor fid.).
During that hearing, the State conceded that it did not have
enough information to get to the $5,000.00 property value
necessary to support second degree felony theft under the
reclassifications (R. 78).
5

The trial court denied defendant's motion to resentence him
to a class A misdemeanor because defendant wwas an informed and
educated Defendant, had adequate opportunity to confer with
counsel, and made a comprehensive settlement of all pending and
potential charges against him by entering a guilty plea to a
single second degree Felony" (R. 64). The trial court's order is
attached as addendum B.
The argument section contains additional relevant facts.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court properly denied defendant's motion.
Defendant based his motion for resentencing on his claim that, at
most, he had stolen $700.00. However, the record does not
support his reliance on that figure.

Defendant admitted to

passing six money orders in Tremonton, but never testified about
their amount.

The State never conceded that defendant had

accurately represented the full number of money orders he had
passed.

The plea bargain did not specify the number of money

orders defendant passed in 1994; to the contrary, it covered all
money orders passed during 1994. More importantly, defendant's
plea necessarily contained an admission that he had stolen
property worth at least enough to support that plea, and
defendant never contested that admission when he pleaded to
€

second degree felony theft.
Moreover, defendant mistakenly contends that the trial court
could not legally impose a second degree felony punishment
because he did not actually commit a second degree felony theft.
In exchange for a plea to a single second degree felony for all
money orders passed during 1994, the State waived its right to
prosecute defendant for any money orders passed during that year.
Because defendant traded a single one-to-fifteen year prison
sentence to eliminate the risk of convictions for an unlimited
number of altered money orders passed during 1994, he got what he
bargained for.

Therefore, he had no right to have his conviction

lowered to a class A misdemeanor.
Either of the above independently supports the trial court's
decision.

Alternatively, defendant is, at most, entitled to a

reduction to a third degree felony.

Even if this Court concludes

that the parties believed defendant was pleading guilty under the
old theft classifications, which required proof of property worth
$1,000.00 or more to support a second degree felony, defendant's
plea to that crime necessarily admitted that property value, and
defendant did not contend otherwise at the time he pleaded.

Even

under the new classifications, that admission supports a third
degree felony.
7

ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY REFUSED TO REDUCE DEFENDANT'S
CONVICTION BECAUSE HE BASES HIS CLAIM THAT HE COMMITTED
ONLY A CLASS A MISDEMEANOR ON AN UNESTABLISHED FACT,
AND BECAUSE HIS CONVICTION AND SENTENCE GAVE HIM WHAT
HE BARGAINED FOR; ALTERNATIVELY, DEFENDANT IS AT MOST
ENTITLED TO A REDUCTION TO A THIRD DEGREE FELONY
Defendant denominated his motion one for resentencing.
However, in support of that motion, defendant contended that the
facts supported, at most, a class A misdemeanor.

Therefore,

regardless of how defendant characterized his motion, he
requested that the trial court reduce the degree of his
conviction from a second degree felony to a class A misdemeanor.
The trial court denied defendant's motion because he "was an
informed and educated Defendant, had adequate opportunity to
confer with counsel, and made a comprehensive settlement of all
pending and potential charges against him by entering a guilty
plea to a single second degree Felony" (R. 64). The trial court
distinguished the sole case on which defendant relied, State v.
Saxton. 519 P.2d 1340 (Utah 1974), because Saxton involved a jury
conviction for a specifically charged crime.

Defendant, by

contrast, negotiated a comprehensive settlement of all pending
and potential charges for 1994 (R. 63). For the reasons argued
below, the trial court correctly refused to reduce defendant's

8

conviction to a class A misdemeanor.
A.

Defendant relies on a fact he never established to

support his clai^ that the trial court should have
lowered his conviction to a class A misdemeanor.
Defendant contends he committed only a class A misdemeanor,
and that the trial court should have reduced his conviction
accordingly.

However, defendant's argument relies entirely on a

fact that he never established: that he stole, at most, $600.00.
Defendant apparently derives this figure from his admission that
he passed a total of six altered money orders, and from the
$100.00 altered amount of the three money orders on which the
State based its original charges.
Nevertheless, the record does not support defendant's claim.
Defendant never stated a total dollar amount for all of the money
orders he passed, and nothing in the record establishes that he
altered all of them to only $100.00. Moreover, defendant's claim
that he passed only six lacks credibility: he admitted to six
passed in Tremonton (R. 31,40), but the State knew of at least
one he passed in Brigham City (R. 5, 77).
On the other hand, defendant's plea necessarily admitted
that he stole property worth enough to support it. At the time
of the plea, he never contended that he stole a lower amount, and
nothing in the record indicates that defendant did not know the
9

amount to which he pleaded.4
The trial court correctly concluded that defendant's
reliance on an unestablished fact distinguishes this case from
the one on which defendant relied below; it also distinguishes
this case from those on which he relies on appeal.

All of those

cases restrict trial courts to imposing the penalty prescribed at
the time of sentencing out of deference to the legislature's
prerogative to establish the level of punishment for any given
set of facts.

State v. Tapp. 490 P.2d 334, 335-36 (Utah 1971);

Belt v. Turner. 479 P.2d 791, 793 (Utah 1971).

However, in those

cases, unlike this case, the established or undisputed facts
supported only the lower penalty.5

In this case, the record does

4

In his brief, defendant suggests that his counsel did not
know that the new theft classifications had taken effect at the
time of his plea. Appellant's Brief at 4. The record does not
support this suggestion. To the contrary, defense counsel stated
at the motion hearing only that he did not know that the forgery
reclassification had taken affect at the time defendant pleaded
(R. 73-75); he never contended that he did not know the new theft
classifications were already in effect.
5

In State Vt SaxtPH, 519 P.2d at 1340-41 and State v. Tapp,
490 P.2d at 335, juries resolved any disputes in the facts
supporting the elements of the charged crimes. In Belt v.
Turner. 479 P.2d at 792, Belt pleaded guilty to issuing a
fraudulent $10.00 check without sufficient funds (a charge that
depended upon the amount of the check to determine the
punishment), and nothing in the opinion suggests any dispute
existed as to the amount for which Belt wrote the check.
10

not establish the $600,00 amount on which defendant relies;
therefore, he has not established that the rule in Belt. Saxton.
and Tapp applies to him.
Defendant cannot rely on a fact he never established to
obtain a reduced conviction and sentence, especially when he
never disputed that the facts support his plea.

B.

Defendant's original second degree felony conviction is
valid because it gave to defendant that for which he
bargained.

Defendant contends that he could not legally be convicted of
a second degree felony because the State could never have proven
sufficient facts to support a second degree felony theft.
Therefore, according to defendant, the trial court should have
reduced his conviction.
Defendant incorrectly contends that the trial court could
not legally sentence him for a crime that the State could not
prove he actually committed.

In Hurst v. Cook. 777 p.2d 1029

(Utah 1989), the Utah Supreme Court acknowledged that Hurst could
not have committed the crime to which he pleaded.

However, the

supreme court refused to order a reduction of his sentence to
that prescribed for the crime he claimed he could have committed
because Hurst got what he bargained for in the plea negotiations.
IlLu at 1038.
11

The same is true for defendant.

Defendant's admissions and

the State's information established that defendant passed a
minimum of seven of the altered money orders in 1994(R. 1, 31,
76).

However, the State did not concede in the trial court and

does not concede on appeal that defendant passed only seven.
Defendant may have actually passed many more, and his agreement
with the State precludes the State from prosecuting him for any
of those passed in exchange for his plea to a second degree
felony.
Moreover, the record does not establish the amount of any
but three of the money orders.6

Those as yet unrecovered,

including the additional four established in the record, may have
exposed him to multiple charges of up to second degree felony
theft by deception.

Only defendant knew the number and the

amount of the money orders he actually passed.

With that

knowledge, he bargained for the State's agreement not to
prosecute him for any of the money orders passed during 1994 in
exchange for his plea to a single second degree felony theft by

^Defendant altered the three money orders on which the State
filed its original charges to $100.00. As noted above, defendant
never stated the amount to which he altered the others.
12

deception.7

Because defendant got what he bargained for, he

cannot seek a reduction in his conviction by contending that the
State could not have proven the crime to which he pleaded.
C.

Id.

Alternatively, defendant is entitled to a maximum

reduction to a third degree felonyAlternatively, defendant is at most entitled to a reduction
to a third degree felony.

At the hearing on his motion to

withdraw the plea, the State acknowledged that it lacked
sufficient information to prove the $5,000.00 necessary to
support a second degree theft conviction under the
reclassifications, then suggested the possibility of lowering
defendant's sentence to a third degree felony (R. 78-79).
As argued above, the State's inability to prove the second
degree felony did not preclude defendant's plea to it, and
consequently, did not preclude his second degree felony sentence.
However, if this Court finds that the State's admissions, taken
as a whole, suggest that the parties based their agreement on the
old theft classifications, defendant's plea still amounts to an

defendant has waived any claim that he based his plea on an
inaccurate understanding of the charges the State may have
brought against him. Although defendant originally sought to
withdraw his plea, he ultimately withdrew that motion. On
appeal, he has not claimed that counsel represented him
ineffectively. Therefore, defendant has preserved no claim that
his bargain was based on a misunderstanding of the law.
13

admission that he stole property worth at least $1,000.00. Utah
Code Ann. § 76-6-412 (1995)(theft was punishable as a second
degree felony if the property value was $1,000.00 or more).

That

admission supports a conviction for third degree felony theft
under the new classifications.
Therefore, even viewing the facts most favorably to
defendant, he is entitled, at most, to a reduction to a third
degree felony.

CONCLUSION
Based on the above, the State asks the Court to affirm
defendant's guilty plea and sentence.

Alternatively, the State

asks the Court to limit any sentence reduction to a third degree
felony.
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED
The State requests oral argument to answer any questions or
concerns the Court may have.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

Z4&

day of sAfrri I ,

JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General

^.c^^r^J^
THOMAS BRUNKER
Assistant Attorney General
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

CRIMINAL CODE

76-6-405

Unauthorized control.
An item need not be taken from a retailer'ss
premises to constitute theft of the retailer's8
property; exercising unauthorized control overr
an item within a retail establishment is suffi-icient to constitute the crime of theft. State v.f'
Watte, 639 P.2d 158 (Utah 1981).
The burden is on the state to prove unautho-J[
rized control, not on the defendant to prove
authorized control; proof of lack of ownershipP
alone does not establish unauthorized control.la
State v. Franks, 649 P.2d 3 (Utah 1982).
A criminal prosecution of what is essentiallyy
a breach of a real estate sale agreement ex-"
tends this section too broadly and therefore thee
conviction cannot stand. State v. Burton, 800D
P.2d 817 (Utah Ct App. 1990).
Although a partnership agreement grantedi
the general partners numerous powers, it con-tained the limitation that a general partnerr
exercise those powers only in the best interestsB
of the partnership; the defendant, a partner,r,
was thus not authorized to deal with partner-ship property in a manner that he knew wass

not in the partnership'6 best interests and he
could be convicted of theft for exercising unauthorized control over partnership property.
State v. Larsen, 834 R2d 586 (Utah Ct. App.
1992).
Venue.
Venue for an offense under this section is
properly laid in any county where an element of
it occurred; the formation of a specific intent to
convert another's property within a county is
sufficient for venue to be proper there, notwithstanding that the actual conversion took place
in another county. State v. Cauble, 563 P.2d 775
(Utah 1977).
Cited in State v. Andreason, 718 P.2d 400
(Utah 1986); In re Jones, 720 P.2d 1356 (Utah
1986); Stevens v. Sanpete County, 640 F. Supp.
S76 (D. Utah 1986); State v. Parkin, 742 R2d
715 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); State v. Jamison, 767
P.2d 134 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); State v. Hunter,
831 R2d 1033 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); State v.
Scott, 860 P.2d 1005 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); State
v. Laraen, 876 P.2d 391 (Utah Ct App. 1994).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 50 Am. Jur. 2d Larceny § 2.
C.J.S. — 52A C.J.S. Larceny § 1(3).
AXJL — Larceny: entrapment or consent,
10AJLR.3dll21.
Criminal offenses in connection with rental
of motor vehicles, 38 A.L.R.3d 949.
Criminal prosecution based upon breaking
into or taking money or goods from vending
machine or other coin-operated machine, 45
A.L.R.3d 1286.

Changing of price tags by patron in selfservice store as criminal offense, 60 A~L.R.3d
1293.
Embezzlement, larceny, false pretenses or
allied criminal fraud by partner, 82 A.L.RSd
822.
Criminal liability for theft of, interference
with, or unauthorized use of computer programs, files, or systems, 51 A.LJt4th 971.

76-6-405. Theft by deception.
(1) A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises control over property of
another by deception and with a purpose to deprive him thereof.
(2) Theft by deception does not occur, however, when there is only falsity as
to matters having no pecuniary significance, or puffing by statements unlikely
to deceive ordinary persons in the group addressed. "Puffing* means an
exaggerated commendation of wares or worth in communications addressed to
the public or to a class or group.
History: C. 1958, 76-6-405, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, S 76-6-405.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Constitutionality.
Attempted theft.
Distribution of imitation controlled substance.

Elements of offense.
—Reliance.
— S e r i e s of misrepresentations.
—Pecuniary loss.
Evidence.

200

76-6-411

CRIMINAL CODE

demand! by owner, court, aitting without a jury, viation" haa the common aenae meaning of
waa not required to believe defendant'! teati- being an extreme deviation. State v. Owena,
mony that he gave typewriter to hi! hnainee! 638 P.2d 1182 (Utah 1981).
partner! to return, eince partner! were not
called to corroborate his atorj, and defendant Use related to purpose of agreement*
conveniently forgot important details. State v.
Subsection (1) ff«wnM that the property
Knepper, 18 Utah 2d 215, 418 P.2d 780 (1966). may be used by the custodian for purposes
Evidence supported conviction of embezzle- properly related to the purpose of the entrustment, where defendant had been given permit- xotnt; only a use that constitutes "a gross
aion to continue to use car on somewhat open] deviation from the agreed purpose," without
ended contract after initial rental period had ^jpngg consent for personal use, is a crime,
—V*3!** * u t d e f e n d*nt ailed to return car on g u t a v 3^^. 6 1 0 VM m h (UUih l 9 8 0 ) 4
•pacific date on which he was finally told that
he must return i t State v. Heemer, 26 Utah 2d
Cited in State v. Owena, 753 P.2d 976 (Utah
309, 489 R2d 107 (1971).
Ct App. 1988).
"Gross deviation."
As used in this section, the term 'gross deCOLLATERA1 REFERENCES
Am.Jur.2d. — 50 Am. Jur. 2d Larceny t 89.
O J A — 52A C J.S. Larceny J§ 46,47.

Key Numbers. — Larceny «» 15.

76-6-411. Repealed*
Repeals. — Section 76-6-411, as enacted by
L. 1973, ch. 196, { 76-6-411, relatingtotheft by
failure to make required payment or disposi-

tion of property subject to legal obligation, was
repealed by Law! 1974, ch. 32, § 41.

76-6-412. Theft — Classification of offenses — Action for
treble damages against receiver of stolen property.
(1) Theft of property and services as provided in this chapter shall be
punishable:
(a) as a felony of the second degree if the:
(i) value of the properly or services exceeds $1,000;
(ii) property stolen is afirearmor an operable motor vehicle;
(iii) actor is armed with a deadly weapon at the time of the theft; or
(iv) property is stolenfromthe person of another;
(b) as a felony of the third degree if the:
(i) value of the property or services is more than $250 but not more
than $1,000;
(ii) actor has been twice before convicted of theft, any robbery, or
any burglary with intent to commit theft; or
(iii) property taken is a stallion, mare, colt, gelding, cow, heifer,
steer, ox, bull, calf, sheep, goat, mule, jack, jenny, swine, or poultry;
(c) as a class A misdemeanor if the value of the property stolen was
more than $100 but does not exceed $250; or
(d) as a class B misdemeanor if the value of the property stolen was
$100 or less.
(2) Any person who has been injured by a violation of Subsection 76-6-408(1)
may bring an action against any person mentioned in Subsection 76-6408(2Xd) for three times the amount of actual damages,
if any sustained by the
plaintiff, costs of suit and reasonable attorneys9 fees.
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1975, ch, 48, a 1; 1977. ch. 89,1 1; 1989. ch*
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Cross-References,—Bua Paaaenger Safety
Act, theft of baggage or cargo, t 76-10-1508.
Civil liability for treble damages for theft of
livestock, ( 4-24-27.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Evidence.
State's use of color photographs of the stolen
property for evidence rather than producing
the actual tangible stolen property did not deny
defendant due process of law. State •.
Ballenberger, 652 R2d 927 (Utah 1982).

ANALYSIS

Constitutionality.
Construction.
Determining degree of crime.
Evidence.
Instructions.
Lesser included offenses.
Livestock.
Prior convictions.
Single offense baaed on separate takings.
Valuation of stolen property.
—Testimony of owner.
Cited.
Constitutionality.
This section, by making theft of certain livestock a third degree felony, irrespective of the
value of the livestock, does not deny equal
protection of the laws and doea not violate the
constitutional prohibition against private or
apecial laws. State v. Clark, 632 P.2d 841 (Utah
1981).

Instructions.
It waa reversible error to omit to instruct as
to amount of debt owing by defendant on auto,
left for repaira, but taken and driven away
without satisfying lien existing on car; if jury
had found that debt waa leas than $50, conviction for grand larceny would have been error.
State v. Parker, 104 Utah 23, 137 PJM 626
(1943).
Leaser included offenses.
The crime of carrying a concealed dangerous
weapon is a leaaer included offense of seconddegree felony retail theft when the retail theft
is made a felony by the actor's being armed
with a deadly weapon in the course of the
crime. State v. Kinsey, 797 P.2d 424 (Utah Ct
App. 1990).

Construction*
This section does not outline the elements of Livestock.
the crime of theft; it simply categorizes theft for
Theft of dead calf was grand larceny, even
sentencing purposes into various degrees of though value of meat did not exceed $50, where
felonies and misdemeanors. Thus defendant animal was killed by thief as means of making
was improperly charged under { 76-6-404 and theft possible. State v. Laub, 102 Utah 402,131
this section with two separate counts of second P.2d 805il942).
degree theft for stealing both a firearm and
property worth over $1000 in a aingle burglary; Prior convictions.
the crime was instead one theft offense under
A judgment of prior conviction must be writ{ 76-6-404 punishable as a second degree fel- ten, clear and definite, and signed by the court
ony under this section. State v. Casias, 772 P.2d (or the clerk in a jury case) in order to serve as
975 (Utah Ct App. 1989).
the basis for enhancing a penalty under this
No claim for treble damages based on } 76- section. State v. Anderson, 797 P.2d 1114 (Utah
6408(2 Xd) and this section against businesses Ct App. 1990).
that regularly deal in large bulk orders of raw
industrial material. See Alta Indus. Ltd. v. Single offense based on separate takings.
Where defendant waa employed to solicit
Hurst, 846 P.2d 1282 (Utah 1993).
advertising contracts and within short time
Determining degree of crime.
had collected from different persons $235 due
In theft by deception, degree of the crime is publishing company upon contracts solicited
determined by the value of the property ob- and procured by him, and where he had unlawtained by defendant as a result of the deception fully converted money to his own use, taking of
without reducing that amount by any value $235 was one embezzlement and constituted
received by the victim. State v. Forshee, 588 grand larceny, even though $48 was largest
P.2d 181 (Utah 1978).
amount collected from any one individual.
Defendants second degree felony conviction, State v. Gibson, 37 Utah 330,108 P. 349 (1910).
based on a check written for exactly $1,000,
The value of the property stolen in separate
was plain error, since he could only have been transactions can be added together to deterconvicted of a third degree felony on the basis of mine the degree of the crime if the separate
the $1,000 check. State v. Burnett, 712 P.2d 260 transactions are part of one continuing plan
(Utah 1985).
and thus constitute a single offense. State v.
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(iv) is or exceeds $5,000 or if the offender has previously been
convicted of a violation of this section, the offense is a second degree
felony,
(b) In the case of theft of cable television services, the penalties are
prescribed in Section 76-6-412.
(5) A person who violates this section shall make restitution to the utility or
cable television company for the value of the gas, electricity, water, sewer, or
cable television service consumed in violation of this section plus all reasonable
expenses and costs incurred on account of the violation of this section.
Reasonable expenses and costs include expenses and costs for investigation,
disconnection, reconnection, service calls, employee time, and equipment use.
(6) Criminal prosecution under this section does not affect the right of a
utility or cable television company to bring a civil action for redress for
damages suffered as a result of the commission of any of the acts prohibited by
this section.
(7) This section does not abridge or alter any other right, action, or remedy
otherwise available to a utility or cable television company.
History: C. 1953,1 70-6-409.3, enacted by
L. 1987, ch. 38, | 8; 1989, ch. 30,1 2; 1990,
ch. 130,1 1; 1995, ch* 291,1 12.
Amendment Notes* — The 1995 amendment, effective May 1, 1995. substituted "any

prohibited acts*for"any of the following acts" in
Subsection (2), rewrote Subsection (4Xa),
changing the value ranges and the degrees of
offenses, and made a minor stylistic change;

76-6-409.6. Use of telecommunication device to avoid lawful charge for service — Penalty.
(1) Any person who uses a telecommunication device with the intent to
avoid the payment of any lawful charge for telecommunication service or with
the knowledge that it was to avoid the payment of any lawful charge for
telecommunication service is guilty of:
(a) a class B misdemeanor, if the value of the telecommunication service
is less than $300 or cannot be ascertained;
(b) a class A misdemeanor, if the value of the telecommunication service
charge is or exceeds $300 but is not more than $1,000;
(c) a third degree felony, if the value of the telecommunication service is
or exceeds $1,000 but is not more than $5,000; or
(d) a second degree felony, if the value of the telecommunication service
is or exceeds $5,000.
(2) Any person who has been convicted previously of an offense under this
section shall be guilty of a second degree felony upon a second conviction and
any subsequent conviction.
History: C. 1953,76-6-409.6, enacted by L.
1994, ch. 215,1 3; 1995, ch. 291,1 13.
Amendment Notes. — The 1995 amendment, effective May 1, 1995, inserted *is less

than $300 or* is Subsection (lXa) and changed
the value ranges in Subsections (lXb) through
(dX

76-6-412. Theft — Classification of offenses — Action for
treble damages against receiver of stolen property.
(1) Theft of property and services as provided in this chapter shall be
mnishable:
(a) as a felony of the second degree if the:

^ v person who n»«

^ y P e J ^*j d a x n age8, t f a I i y

sag*** «»*

-Writinr

(3) Forgery » f t i e

deftned4

. ^ d anyone, o r * *
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Kimbel, 620 P.2d 515 (Utah 1980).
Valuation of stolen property.
Where auto owner took his car from possession of repairman by trick, or otherwise stole
special property of bailee, value was amount of
indebtedness; where thing stolen was written
instrument evidencing debt, its value was determined by amount remaining unpaid
thereon. State v. Parker, 104 Utah 23,137 P.2d
626 (1943).
Stealing of purse which was 1 H feet from
owner was not grand larceny in absence of proof
of value. SUte v. Lucero, 28 Utah 2d 61, 498
P.2d 350 (1972).
For purposes of determining the degree of an
offense graded in terms of the value of the
property stolen, the proper measure is the
current market value of the property at the
time and place where the alleged offense was
committed. State v. Logan, 663 P.2d 811 (Utah
1977).
Evidence was sufficient to establish beyond a
reasonable doubt that more than $250 had been
stolen from washers and dryers in a coinoperated laundromat where laundromat owner,
who had operated the business for twelve
years, testified that roughly $600 to $800 was
missing based upon estimates from money in
the machines that were not disturbed and the
total amount of money found in defendant's
possession was nearly $600. State v. Whittenback, 621 P.2d 103 (Utah 1980).
The prima facie value of a stolen check is its
face value whether the check is endorsed or not
State v. Pacheco, 636 P.2d 489 (Utah 1981).
Evidence held sufficient to establish at least

$250 embezzled by theater manager. State v.
Patterson, 700 R2d 1104 (Utah 1985).
lb prove market value in a different city, the
cities must be sufficiently close geographically
and similar in population to be considered
comparable for purposes of valuing the property. SUte v. Carter, 707 PJ2d 656 (Utah 1985).
—Testimony of owner.
Owner is competent to testify to the value of
stolen property where the owner's opinion of
the value is based on comparable prices for
similar property. State v. limb, 681 P.2d 142
(Utah 1978).
Owner of the stolen property was allowed to
give his opinion as to the value of such property.
SUte v. Ballenberger, 652 P.2d 927 (Utah 1982).
Because an owner is presumed to be familiar
with the value of his possessions, an owner i*
competent to testify on the present market
value of his property. SUU v. Purcell, 711 P.2d
243 (Utah 1985).
Owner's testimony that a stolen ring was
worth $200 was inadmissible, because he had
no independent knowledge or memory of its
value nor was his memory refreshed after looking at a police report SUU v. Oliver, 820 P.2d
474 (Utah Ct App. 1991), cert denied, 843 R2d
516 (Utah 1992).
Cited in SUU v. Slowe, 728 P.2d 110 (Utah
1985); SUU v. Parkin, 742 P.2d 715 (Utah Ct
App. 1987); SUU v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616
(Utah 1987); SUU v. Branch, 743 P.2d 1187
(Utah 1987); SUU v. Barber, 747 P.2d 436
(Utah Ct. App. 1987); SUU v. Hunter, 831 R2d
1033 (Utah Ct App. 1992).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am.Jur.2d —50 Am. Jur. 2d Larceny § 44.
CJJ5. — 52A C.J3. Larceny ft 60(1).

Key Numbers, — Larceny * • 23.

PARTS
FRAUD
76-6-501. Forgery — "Writing* defined.
(1) A person is guilty of forgery if, with purpose to defraud anyone, or with
knowledge that he is facilitating afraudto be perpetrated by anyone, he:
(a) alters any writing of another without his authority or utters any
such altered writing; or
(b) makes, completes, executes, authenticates, issues, transfers, publishes, or utters any writing so that the writing or the making, completion,
execution, authentication, issuance, transference, publication or utterance
purports to be the act of another, whether the person is existent or
nonexistent, or purports to have been executed at a time or place or in a
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numbered sequence other than was in fact the case, or to be a copy of an
original when no such original existed.
0) A* used in this section "writing* includes printing or any other method of
recording information, checks, tokens, stamps, seals, credit cards, badges,
trademarks, money, and any other symbols of value, right, privilege, or
jfcntification.
(3) Forgery is a felony of the second degree if the writing is or purports to be:
(a) a security, revenue stamp, or any other instrument or writing issued
ty a government, or any agency thereof; or
(b) a check with a face amount of $100 or more, an issue of stocks,
bonds, or any other instrument or writing representing an interest in or
daim against property, or a pecuniary interest in or claim against any
person or enterprise.
(4) Forgery is a felony of the third degree if the writing is or purports to be
I check with a face amount of less than $100; all other forgery is a class A
misdemeanor.
Ostory: C. 1953,76-6-601, enacted by L.
Itn, eh. 196,1 76-6-501; 1974, ch. 82,1 19;
HTSteh.52,1 1.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Attempt
Attareey signing client's name,
aatbonty to use forged signature.
Gssnficsuon of document
•bitnity.

-Postdated check.
fisaeots of offense.
- Hiking and passing.
—Pissing
~&Cnitura,
Wince.
—Hud writing.
-Other crimes.
—Sufficient
Fife pretenses distinguished.
rVntwus name.
btament or information.
httptTUke* or "utter."
fcesenption.
Stpitura
~ b general.
^Authority to sign another's name.
Standard of proof:
Cuenng.
fenance,
*r*ct
Qtai

for it was immaterial that attempt to utter was
unsuccessful; it was fact of uttering or attempt*
ing to utter that was of evidentiary value. State
v. Green, 89 Utah 437, 57 R2d 750 (1936).
The crime of attempted forgery involves the
same culpability and dishonesty as does the
crime of forgery itaelfl State v. Rots, 782 P.2d
629 (Utah CtApp. 1989).
Attorney signing client's name*
Section 78-51-32, which authorizes an attorney to execute documents in the name of a
client, does not authorize an attorney toforgea
client's name to a negotiable instrument such
as a settlement check and does not preclude the
attorney's conviction for forgery as a matter of
law when he does so; however, when an attorney acts pursuant to the general authority
granted by J 78-51-32 he may not later be
convicted of forgery State v. Musselman, 667
P.2d 1061 (Utah 1983).
Authority to use forged signature.
Where defendant forged his accomplice's
name on checks which accomplice owned but
had reported stolen, then cashed the checks
and split the proceeds with the accomplice,
defendant committed forgery as defined under
Subsection (lXb), notwithstanding that the accomplice authorized defendant to sign his
name. State v. Collins, 597 P.2d 1317 (Utah
1979).

^sart information charging offense of forg- Classification of document
•y osottined one count for forgery and another
The trial court erred in conduding that a
w ottering, attempt to utter could be shown. "receipt,* a document representing that a cus-
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(i) value of the property or services is or exceeds $5,000;
(ii) property stolen is afirearmor an operable motor vehicle;
(iii) actor is armed with a deadly weapon at the time of the theft; or
(iv) property is stolen from the person of another,
,) as a felony of the third degree if the:
(i) value of the property or services is or exceeds $1,000 but is less
than $5,000;
(ii) actor has been twice before convicted of theft, any robbery, or
any burglary with intent to commit theft; or
(iii) property taken is a stallion, mare, colt, gelding, cow, heifer,
steer, ox, bull, calf, sheep, goat, mule, jack, jenny, swine, or poultry;
:) as a class A misdemeanor if the value of the property stolen is or
eeds $300 but is less than $1,000; or
i) as a class B misdemeanor if the value of the property stolen is less
in $300.
ny person who has been injured by a violation of Subsection 76-6*408(1)
ring an action against any person mentioned in Subsection 76-6d) for three times the amount of actual damages, if any sustained by the
ST, costs of suit and reasonable attorneys' fees.
ry: C. 1963, 76-6-412, enacted by L.
Amendment Notes. — The 1995 amendu 196,1 76-6-412; 1974, ch. 32, ( 18; ment, effective May 1, 1995, increased the
u 48,1 1; 1977, ch. 89,1 1; 1989, ch. value amount* in Subjection* (IXaXi), (IXbXi),
1995, ch. 291,1 14.
(1XO, and (lXd).

PARTS
FRAUD
501. Forgery — "Writing* defined.
A person is guilty of forgery if, with purpose to defraud anyone, or with
edge that he is facilitating afraudto be perpetrated by anyone, he:
(a) alters any writing of another without his authority or utters any
ach altered writing; or
(b) makes, completes, executes, authenticates, issues, transfers, pubshes, or utters any writing so that the writing or the making, completion,
xecution, authentication, issuance, transference, publication or utterance
airports to be the act of another, whether the person is existent or
lonexistent, or purports to have been executed at a time or place or in a
lumbered sequence other than was in fact the case, or to be a copy of an
iriginal when no such original existed.
As used in this section, "writing* includes:
(a) printing or any other method of recording information, checks,
tokens, stamps, seals, credit cards, badges, trademarks, money, and any
>ther symbols of value, right, privilege, or identification;
(b) printing or writing a security, revenue stamp, or any other instrument or writing issued by a government or any agency, or
(c) printing or writing a check, an issue of stocks, bonds, or any other
instrument or writing representing an interest in or claim against
property, or a pecuniary interest in or claim against any person or
enterprise.
) Forgery is a felony of the third degree.
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History: C. 1953, 764-601, enacted by L. tion (2); deleted "with a face amount of $100 or
1978, eh. 196,1 764-501; 1974, ch. 82, | 19; more" after "a check" in Subsection (2XO; de1975, ch-52,1 1; 1995, ch- 291, ( 15.
leted If the writing if or purport* to be a check
Amendment Notes. — The 1995 amend- with a face amount of leas than $100; all other
ment, effective May 1, 1995, incorporated for- forgery if a claee A misdemeanor*fromthe end
mer Subsection (3), which had set out the of Subsection (3>, and made minor stylistic
elements of second degree forgery, into Subeec- changes throughout the section.

76-6-505. Issuing a bad check or draft — Presumption.
(1) Any person who issues or passes a check or draft for the payment of
money, for the purpose of obtaining from any person, firm, partnership, or
corporation, any money, property, or other thing of value or paying for any
services, wages, salary, labor, or rent, knowing it will not be paid by the drawee
and payment is refused by the drawee, is guilty of issuing a bad check or draft
For purposes of this subsection, a person who issues a check or draft for
which payment is refused by the drawee is presumed to know the check or
draft would not be paid if he had no account with the drawee at the time of
issue.
(2) Any person who issues or passes a check or draft for the payment of
money, for the purpose of obtaining from any person, firm, partnership, or
corporation, any money, property, or other thing of value or paying for any
services, wages, salary, labor, or rent, payment of which check or draft is
legally refused by the drawee, is guilty of issuing a bad check or draft if he fails
to make good and actual payment to the payee in the amount of the refused
check or draft within 14 days of his receiving actual notice of the check or
draff8 nonpayment.
(3) An offense of issuing a bad check or draft shall be punished as follows:
(a) If the check or draft or series of checks or drafts made or drawn in
this state within a period not exceeding six months amounts to a sum that
is less than $300, the offense is a class B misdemeanor.
(b) If the check or draft or checks or drafts made or drawn in this state
within a period not exceeding six months amounts to a sum that is or
exceeds $300 but is less than $1,000, the offense is a class A misdemeanor.
(c) If the check or draft or checks or drafts made or drawn in this state
within a period not exceeding six months amounts to a sum that is or
exceeds $1,000 but is less than $5,000, the offense is a felony of the third
degree.
(d) If the check or draft or checks or drafts made or drawn in this state
within a period not exceeding six months amounts to a sum that is or
exceeds $5,000, the offense is a second degree felony.
History: C. 1953, 70-6-505, enacted by L. ment, effective May 1, 1995, tocreaaed the
1973, ch. 196,1 76-6-505; 1977, ch. 91, i 1; value amounts in Subsections (3Xa) through
1983, ch. 92, | 1; 1995, ch. 291,1 16.
(3Xd).
Amendment Notes. — The 1995 amend-

76-6-506.1. Financial transaction card offenses — Falsely
making, coding, or signing card — Falsely signing evidence of card transaction.
Any person is guilty of a third degree felony who, with intent to defraud:
(1) counterfeits, falsely makes, embosses, or encodes magnetically or
electronically any financial transaction card;

ADDENDUM B

IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOX ELDER, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
MEMORANDUM DECISION
PLAINTIFF,
vs.

LARRY BRUCE DIETZ
aka THOMAS LEONARD

CASE NO. 951000059
HONORABLE BEN H. HADFIELD

DEFENDANT.

This matter comes before the Court pursuant to the Defendant's Motion For
Resentencing. Prior to filing mis Motion, the Defendant had timely filed a Motion To
Withdraw Plea. At a hearing on October 16,1995, with the Defendant personally present,
the Defendant, through his attorney, directed mat the Motion To Withdraw Plea should itself
be withdrawn. The Court advised the Defendant mat it was the Court's intention to grant the
Motion To Withdraw Plea, but if the Defendant withdrew the Motion, the Court no longer
had that option. After conferring with counsel, the Motion To Withdraw Plea was
voluntarily withdrawn by the Defendant.
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The Defendant's guilty plea was a result of negotiations with the County Attorney.
Relevant portions of the transcript of the hearing on May 15,1995 include the following:
Mr. Bunderson:

Actually, your Honor, Fve prepared an amended Information, if
Mr. Dietz is prepared to enter a plea of guilty to it. I'd make a
motion to file that. I sent a copy to counsel on May 5th. I
have alleged a new single count of theft by deception, a Felony
of the second degree. It combines all of the counts in Box
Elder County during 1994. We're aware of three. I suspect
there may be more.

Mr. Snider:

Part of the deal is that if any one else files additional
complaints, he would have to pay full restitution, but this would
resolve all of the checks arising from this period of time issued
by Mr. Dietz.

(Transcript Page 3, Lines 11 - 23)
******************

Mr. Bunderson:

Basically, what Mr. Dietz does is, as a method of being able to
forge Money Orders, he buys $3.00 denomination Money
Orders under phony names, and then forges the Money Order to
make it $100 Money Order, and then purchases something. He
did that at the three places alleged in the Information, all of
which happened to be in Tremonton. We believe he did more
than that, and he has admitted to doing, privately anyway,
admitted to doing more than just those three places in Box Elder
County during 1994, which would cause this to rise, if they are
all lumped together, to the appropriate level for a second degree
Felony. He was charged earlier with multiple second degree
Felonies, but because of recent legislative changes, it is
appropriate to lump them all together and make a single second
degree.
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The Court:

Is that statement essentially correct as to what occurred, Mr.
Dietz?

Mr. Dietz:

That's true, your Honor.

The Court:

Alright. The maximum penalties for a second degree are a term
of 1 - 15 years in the Utah State Prison, and a fine of up to
$10,000.00. Do you understand that, Mr. Dietz?

Mr. Dietz:

I understand that.

(Transcript Page 8, lines 5 - 2 5 ; Page 9, lines 1 - 3 )

The Motion For Resentencing claims that prior to Defendant's entry of plea, the Utah
State Legislature amended 76-6-412 which reclassified the current offense as a Class A
Misdemeanor. Defendant has attached a copy of the opinion in State vs Gary R. Saxton
519 P.2d 1340, (Utah 1974). In that case, the Supreme Court required the Defendant to be
resentenced with the benefit of the lesser punishment imposed by the intervening statutory
change. The Court finds significant differences between Saxton and the present case. In
Saxton a Jury Trial was held, and the Defendant was convicted of a specifically charged
crime based upon the evidence presented at trial. In the present case, the Defendant, through
counsel, negotiated a comprehensive agreement whereby not only currently pending charges
against the Defendant were dismissed, but also all potential forgery charges relating to Box
Elder County for the year 1994 were precluded from being filed, in exchange for
Defendant's guilty plea to a single, second degree Felony..
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After review of the file and die hearing transcript, this Court is of the opinion that the
Defendant, who, at the time of sentencing was on federal probation, was an informed and
educated Defendant, had adequate opportunity to confer with counsel, and made a
comprehensive settlement of all pending and potential charges against him by entering a
guilty plea to a single second degree Felony. The Court finds the opinion in State vs Saxton
inapplicable to the present circumstances. The Defendant's Motion For Resentencing is
denied.

DATED this 3 l * d a y of October, 1995.

